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Defence cooperation between Western European countries has increased considerably
since the end of the Cold War. An analytical distinction can be made between political
and economic cooperation, the latter having been neglected by political scientists. This
study advances the debate on economic cooperation by identifying sources of variation
in the European Union (EU)-15 countries’ membership rate in cooperative armaments
fora aimed at restructuring the demand side of European defence from 1996 to 2006.
By combining six models from three different schools of thought, the risk of confirmation
bias through intra-paradigmatic reasoning is reduced. At the same time, fuzzy-set analysis
opens up the space for data-driven combination effects. Two distinct combinations form
sufficient paths leading to high rates of membership. Most importantly, intentions to
create collective defence technological and industrial benefits combine with trust in
partners’ ability and integrity to form an essential combination of conditions for
governments to pursue cooperation on armaments.
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Introduction
Cooperation between governments has attracted substantial attention from
political scientists. A particular instance in which academic interest has increased
noticeably since the early 1990s has been cooperation between European Union
(EU) member states in matters of defence (Howorth, 2007; Jones, 2007; Me´rand,
2008). Almost 40 years after the abortive attempt to establish the European
Defence Community, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) contained the first
official reference to the progressive framing of a common European defence policy
and encouraged member states to supplement this path with economic cooperation
in the field of armaments.
European defence cooperation was thus to consist of two processes that would
not have to be simultaneous, but have been considered complementary. The
first concerns the political coordination of foreign policies among governments,
whereas the second appertains to matters of economic cooperation in armaments
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research, development, production, standardization, procurement, or trade.
However, while the political path has caught the academic limelight, economic
aspects of that coordination have been neglected. This imbalance stands in need of
redress for two reasons. First, an unprecedented consolidation of defence indus-
tries within and across national borders over the past 15 years has been accom-
panied by the emergence of a complex landscape of formalized intergovernmental
fora (Schmitt, 2003: 12).1 While the former has represented a fundamental
reorganization of the supply side, the latter is nothing less than a concerted effort
to restructure the demand side of defence (To¨rnqvist, 2001). Second, the drive
towards political cooperation has been inevitably linked to cooperation on
armaments from the start, without which its benefits would not be fully realized.
However, EU member states have responded differently to opportunities for
restructuring the demand side. The question this study attempts to answer is why
they have done so.
It has become a truism among political scientists that international phenomena
cannot be fully comprehended without combining conditions found at the
domestic and international level (Putnam, 1988; Evans, 1993; Moravcsik, 1997).
This observation is specifically true for armaments cooperation, a policy domain
that straddles the traditional demarcation line between the ‘high politics’ of
security and the ‘low politics’ of economics (Taylor, 1990; Liberman, 1996;
Mo¨rth and Britz, 2004). Moravcsik (1993a, b), Kapstein (1991), Kocs (1995),
Taylor (1982) and Tucker (1991), for instance, show how international coop-
eration has been shaped by ‘competing imperatives’ in conflicts of interest
between governments and firms. In contrast, Legro (1996), Mawdsley (2000), and
Mo¨rth and Britz (2004) imply that any analysis of the interest formation process
preceding intergovernmental cooperation is incomplete without allowing for
the influence of culture. These authors illustrate that combinations of conditions
can provide a fuller explanation, but they disagree about their composition and
weighting.2
Instead of narrow pre-selection, an alternative strategy is to associate a wider
set of perspectives with the outcome, and let the empirics identify which single
condition, or combination of conditions, fits the data best (cf. Koenig-Archibugi,
2004). As Wendt stresses in this regard, ‘Realism does not have a monopoly on the
ugly and brutal side of international life’, so ‘treating ideas and material condi-
tions as separate but inevitably linked phenomena is a way of disentangling their
respective effects’ (Wendt, 1995: 76; 2000: 167). In like manner, Mearsheimer
1 I use the term ‘forum’ in order to distinguish it from the more general meaning of an ‘institution’ or
a ‘regime’, and the more specific meaning of an ‘organization’ (cf. Hasenclever et al., 1997: 10). For the
purposes of this article, a forum is defined as a formalized intergovernmental agreement that may or may
not be supported by a physical organizational structure.
2 To remain consistent with fuzzy-set terminology, a condition, or causal condition, represents an
element of a configuration that is comparable to the concept of an independent variable. An outcome, or
outcome condition is comparable to the dependent variable.
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(1990) holds that when the omission of Realist variables is corrected, liberal rea-
soning will collapse. There are two decisive advantages in using a more eclectic
approach. First, the risk of omitting potentially important conditions that fall outside
the realm of a single paradigm is reduced, which may lead to what econometricians
call omitted-variable bias and psychologists refer to as confirmation bias.3 Although
competing theories are often included, these do not always stand on an impartial
analytical footing. As Checkel (2008: 120) puts it, ‘[i]f they are honest, most scholars
will admit to having favourite theories’. Such treatments, however, are akin in effect
to creating confirmation bias.4 Second, the possibility that different models can be
combined opens up the space for distinct, combinatorial pathways to one and the
same outcome, a situation referred to as ‘equifinality’, ‘substitutability’, or ‘multiple
conjunctural causation’ (Ragin, 2000: 104; George and Bennett, 2005: 157; Starr,
2005: 358; Goertz, 2006: 63).5
This study contributes to the literature on armaments cooperation between
European governments. It answers the question of which condition, or combination
of conditions, may help explain variation in the rate of formal governmental
membership in fora of armaments cooperation between 1996 and 2006. The
explanatory side of the equation consists of six models (1) that balance different
paradigms and therefore reduce the risk of bias, (2) whose respective conditions
capture state-level characteristics, and (3) that are not mutually exclusive.
Scholars who underline the importance of domestic culture for international
cooperation cite the degree to which a country is federalist in character (e.g.
Jachtenfuchs, 2002; Wagner, 2002; Risse, 2005; Rittberger, 2005), an argument
summarized under the constitutional-culture model. The homogeneity-trust
model argues that cooperation may also be brought about by social interaction
(e.g. Adler and Barnett, 1996; Wendt, 1999; Tonra, 2003; King, 2005). In con-
tradistinction, Realists have emphasized the relative positionality of states in an
international system that informs their policy decisions. Under the power-differential
model, position affects the propensity to cooperate or not (e.g. Art, 1996; Jervis,
2005; Walt, 2005). The security-dependence model extends the argument by
3 More precisely, omitted-variable bias is the positive or negative distortion in the estimated effect of
an explanatory variable on the explained variable that arises when a correlated, excluded variable
actually has an effect. Confirmation bias refers to a weak form of case building in which the failure to
take the likelihood ratios of competing hypotheses into account may result in misjudgements of evidence
(Nickerson, 1998).
4 This is not to argue that the more potentially relevant variables are included, the lower the risk of
bias. In fact, even relevant control variables may induce more bias into coefficients of linear or generalized
linear models than would have been induced if they had not been included (Clarke, 2005, 2009), and they
create an exponentially growing number of potentially empty configurations in set-based methods.
5 The downside is that conditions have to remain at a rather unrefined level. This disadvantage can be
eliminated in multiple-step optimization procedures, where hypothesis testing can proceed from a high
level of aggregation to more refined set-ups once relevant ‘rough’ conditions have been identified. For a
similar logic using remote and proximate conditions, see Schneider and Wagemann (2006). I will use the
term ‘model’ throughout the text to describe any relationship between causal condition(s) and outcome.
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pointing out that national power capabilities are nugatory for a state’s security if
they are largely sustained by imported resources. This creates a potentially threa-
tening situation in which disruptions open up windows of vulnerability (e.g. Grieco,
1988; Huntington, 1993; Waltz, 2000). When scholarship emphasizes groups of
actors in the domestic arena, in contrast, the focus of attention is on their respective
influence on the policymaking process. While the policy-responsiveness model
argues that government policy is a function of domestic public opinion (e.g. Page
and Shapiro, 1983; Erikson et al., 2002; Eichenberg and Stoll, 2003), the market-
competition model stresses the role of business (e.g. Moravcsik, 1993a, b; Domhoff,
2002; Jacobs and Page, 2005).
Fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) represents an appropriate
method for implementing the approach laid out above, for reasons that will
become clearer in the methodological section. But most importantly, from the
viewpoint of theory-building, it allows the data to determine the combination that
accounts best for the connection between conditions and outcome.
The article is structured around five sections. First, the outcome condition is
introduced. Second, the six models are constructed in sufficient detail, and their
operationalisation subsequently laid out in the third section. Fourth, the logic of
fuzzy-set QCA is explained more fully, as it differs from traditional methods for
hypothesis testing. And fifth, the results are presented, analyzed, and interpreted,
followed by the conclusions.
Intergovernmental armaments cooperation
Even though post-war cooperative defence initiatives date back to the 1950s, the
TEU marked the first time that official reference was made to the progressive
framing of a truly common European defence policy. After the way had been
cleared at St. Malo in 1998, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)
emerged.6 One of the most important elements in this process was defined as
capability improvement through cooperation on armaments in order to make
available the equipment necessary to fulfil the kind of missions envisaged by the
Petersberg Tasks, and further specified in the Helsinki Headline Goal of 1999, the
European Capabilities Action Plan of 2001, the 2010 Headline Goal of 2004, and
the Capability Development Plan of 2008. The European Commission was in no
doubt about the military benefits of such a course of action, particularly against
the backdrop of contracting defence budgets, but also cautioned that the ‘ana-
chronic fragmentation of the defence markets in Europe’ may lead to ‘massive job
losses and the disappearance of technological skills [y]’ (European Commission,
1996: 3, 29). Cooperation reduces the wasteful duplication of overheads, such as
research and testing, it generates economies of scale and learning, and thus contributes
6 With the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the ESDP has been renamed the Common Security and
Defence Policy.
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to the competitiveness of Europe’s defence technological and industrial base.7
From an operational and economic perspective, the arguments in favour of
armaments cooperation were therefore compelling (cf. Lorell and Lowell, 1995).
The TEU left the production, trade, and procurement of military goods and
services almost entirely in the hands of national governments. Article 346 of the
Lisbon Treaty (ex article 296 TEC), which codifies the exemption of armaments-
related issues from the rules of the Common Market, is still regularly invoked
(European Commission, 2007; Hartley, 2008). Nonetheless, on the supply side,
the consolidation of defence industries increasingly shifted from domestic to
cross-border activity during the 1990s, thereby promoting rationalization and
integration on a European scale. On the demand side, governments have not only
been cooperating on specific projects, but also have more generally aimed at
putting joint procurement procedures, R&D, and technical as well as legislative
harmonization on a durable basis beyond individual equipment programmes.
In conjunction with Italy and Germany, France and the United Kingom
established the Organisation Conjointe de Coope´ration en Matie`re d’Armement
(OCCAR) in November 1996, following a Franco-German declaration in 1993
stating their intention to form a structure for administering collaborative defence
equipment programmes (Hartley, 2006: 475). As OCCAR is a legal entity, it can
sign contracts with industry on behalf of governments. Currently, seven projects
are being managed, including the six-nation A400M airlift transport, the Franco-
Italian Fre´gate Europe´enne Multi-Missions, and the German-Dutch Boxer
armoured utility vehicle.
Another example of intergovernmental cooperation was the Letter of Intent
(LoI), which was established by the Defence Ministers of France, Germany, Spain,
Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom in July 1998. Initially, its main aim was to
lay out the general basis for the restructuring of the West European defence
industry, but later the emphasis shifted to the formulation of concrete measures
for harmonizing military equipment, improving security of supply, increasing
cooperation on research, and reducing legislative impediments (Mawdsley, 2008).
Other fora have a clear regional focus in addition to a functional one. In
November 1994, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Norway established the Nordic
Armaments Cooperation Agreement (NORDAC), which facilitates cooperative
projects between their naval, land, and air forces in order to achieve financial,
technical, and industrial benefits.8 The brief description of these three examples
shows that armaments cooperation has not been confined to the ambit of EU
7 Multinational cooperation on research is estimated to offer a 5:1 return on investment (UK Ministry
of Defence, 2005: 26). Compared to national development costs Cn, the costs of p-lateral programmes
Cp ¼ Cn ﬃﬃﬃpp . Cooperation involves cost reductions, but generally no cost efficiencies.
8 Regional agreements should not bias the results for two reasons. First, NORDAC is also open to
non-regional countries. Second, the concept of regional cooperation is not exclusionary. Cooperative
policies do not depend on geographical location. NORDAC was integrated into Nordic Defence
Cooperation (NORDEFCO) in November 2009.
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treaties, and that the dimensions along which their expected benefits can be
aligned are economic rather than political.
Common to all fora is the objective to achieve these benefits for their members.
Even though conflicts over their distribution may impede practical effectiveness
and lead to allocative inefficiency, participation, because it is of very low public
visibility, testifies to governments’ genuine intent to create practical collective
gains rather than to join in political acts of rhetorical magniloquence. The fact
that rates of membership vary thus begs the question as to why some governments
have exhibited a propensity to enter into cooperation while others have stayed
out. What factors account for this uneven pattern across Western Europe?
Theoretical approaches and causal conditions
The following section introduces six explanatory approaches. The arguments of
the constitutional-culture model and the homogeneity-trust model follow a
Constructivist pattern. In contrast, Realist thinking in international relations lies
at the core of the power-differential model and the security-dependence model.
Liberal accounts have been shaped by debates about the influence of public opinion
on government policy under the policy-responsiveness model, and industrial interests
under the market-competition model.
Constitutional culture
A number of works on European integration direct attention to a factor that draws
on assumptions about the national collective identity of states. In the opinion of
scholars espousing this perspective, a country’s willingness to engage in projects of
European cooperation can be understood as a function of its domestic constitu-
tional tradition with respect to its embrace of federalist structures. Tracing the
historical evolution of the European Parliament, Rittberger (2005) shows that the
inter-state haggling over the complexion and functions of the nascent European
institutions was influenced by national constitutional traditions, an argument
Wagner (2002) extends to the 1990s. Similarly, Hooghe and Marks (2001: 157)
find that the attitudes of Commission officials towards the issue of European
governance can be predicted with some confidence based on the degree to which the
country they come from has a federalist tradition. So, even officials exposed to
environments in which the effect of national constitutional socialization should be
expected to decrease in relevance seem to retain much of their initial mindset.
Bulmer (1997) examines the degree to which Germany’s federalist system has
structured the EU’s system of governance. The practice of solving domestic pro-
blems through power-sharing mechanisms has to a large degree informed German
policy on European integration, which itself has become remarkably congruent
with German federalist structures in many respects, the author holds. Risse (2005:
304) addresses Wiener’s (2003) critique of Constructivism’s awkward relationship
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with defence and security issues by arguing that states with a federalist tradition are
more willing to communitarize foreign and defence policies, courtesy of their
inherent preparedness to share sovereignty, and prefer cooperation to unilateralism.
There is no reason to suspect that this logic should not be applicable to cooperation
on armaments. Based on the constitutional culture model, it is hypothesized that:
HYPOTHESIS 1: EU member states with a tradition of federalist political authority
show a high rate of membership in cooperative armaments fora.
Homogeneity and trust
Constructivist arguments on European integration have often been supported by
literature on socialization, behavioural adaptation, and group formation, be it in
the case of states (Wendt, 2000), officials (Hooghe and Marks, 2001), or national
representatives (Lewis, 2005). They share the feature of ‘a social process through
which agent properties and preferences change as a result of interaction’ (Checkel
and Moravcsik, 2001: 220). Social interaction is related to behaviour because it
entails a process of mutual convergence within groups of actors (Wendt, 1999: 82).
According to Aronson et al. (2007: 272), a group consists of ‘two or more people
who interact and are interdependent in the sense that their needs and goals cause
them to influence each other’.9 There is a particular characteristic present in groups
that unites its members – homogeneity. This phenomenon has two facets to it, the
first of which antedates group formation, so that what Feld (1982) has referred to as
‘specific foci’ bring together preferentially homogeneous sets of people with similar
‘needs’. These needs may be founded on common characteristics or interests. The
other facet then accompanies and post-dates it. Groups, once established, operate in
such a way that further homogenization is encouraged. Hence, not only does an
initial similarity in preferential homogeneity already exist prior to group formation,
but the group consolidation process itself further amplifies tendencies towards more
similarity (Levine and Moreland, 1990: 597).
Sometimes, the focus of the group is functionally rather than preferentially
determined, so that the group formation process rests on the achievement of a
common ‘goal’. When individuals form a group or an existing group depends on
the help of another group to complete a task, then this process increases cohe-
siveness between their members (Mullen and Copper, 1994).
Members of preferential groups benefit from a similarity-trust advantage as a
result of norm congruence. In contrast, trust towards outsiders will only be
developed if they are found to be either preferentially or functionally homo-
geneous and do not stand in competitive interdependence. Trust is understood as
the ‘willingness to rely on another’s actions in a situation involving the risk of
opportunism’ (Williams, 2001: 378), based on expectations of the helpfulness, or
at least harmlessness, of others’ behaviour (Gambetta, 1988). These expectations
9 Emphasis added.
Intergovernmental armaments cooperation 7
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773910000251
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 17:33:06, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
lead to assessments of outsiders’ ability and integrity, which will be more
favourable if they are found to be either preferentially or functionally homo-
geneous (Williams, 2001). Ability is simply the ‘group of skills, competencies, and
characteristics that enable a party to have influence within some specific domain’,
whereas integrity is the trustee’s adherence ‘to a set of principles that the trustor
finds acceptable’ (Mayer et al., 1995: 717, 719).
Transposed from social psychology and organization science to the discipline of
political science, Tonra (2003) and King (2005) suggest that the Common Foreign
and Security Policy (CFSP) and the ESDP, respectively, be regarded as regimes that
induce a convergence of expectations between the actors involved and a process that
lets parties assess others’ ability and integrity. The same holds true for the economic
side of defence cooperation. The Swedish Ministry of Defence (2004: 19), for
instance, only wants to enter into cooperation with ‘the most important countries as
regards the international skills we need for our equipment supply’, while the UK
Ministry of Defence (2005: 45) emphasizes mutual understanding and trust. Others,
such as Adler and Barnett (1996), resuscitate the concept of ‘security communities’,
which are characterized by a process of face-to-face interaction, a core of shared
values and beliefs, and reciprocity. The ‘thickness’ of this process leads to the con-
vergence of identity and behaviour via the number of interactions – the quantitative
channel – as well as the intensity and duration of the interaction – the qualitative
channel – so that ‘shared identities [y] will produce a desire for military coop-
eration’ (Adler and Barnett, 1996: 94). Based on the homogeneity-trust model, it is
hypothesized that:
HYPOTHESIS 2: EU member states with high levels of preferential or functional
homogeneity also show a high rate of membership in cooperative
armaments fora.
Power differentials
Realism is often regarded as the touchstone of International Relations, the
yardstick against which all competing theories must be measured at one point or
another in order to pass muster (Waltz, 2000). For Realists, the fundamental goal
of states is their survival through the prevention of relative declines in capabilities
(Grieco, 1988: 498; Mearsheimer, 2001: 46), as they can never be sure whether
today’s friend will not be tomorrow’s enemy (Waltz, 1959: 188). To this end,
balancing and bandwagoning provide strategic policy options.
Balancing Theory has experienced a revival over the course of the 1990s, albeit
in ‘softer’ versions de-emphasizing open military confrontation and armed conflict
(e.g. Posen, 2006). Art (2006: 183) defines balancing as ‘behaviour designed to
create a better range of outcomes for a state vis-a`-vis another state or coalition of
states by adding to the power assets at its disposal, in an attempt to offset or
diminish the advantages enjoyed by that other state or coalition’. Put differently,
the process of balancing describes an (concerted) attempt by a weaker state (a group
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of weaker states) to prevent a rising power from assuming sole leadership, or of
preventing a state that is already riding the crest of unipolarity from becoming a
hegemon (Paul, 2004: 2). The emergence of European security and defence coop-
eration has provided a particularly fertile ground. Scholars espousing this perspec-
tive interpret the drive towards cooperation in defence within Europe as a
manifestation of balancing on the part of the larger states against the United States
(Art, 2004, 2006; Layne, 2003, 2006).
The concept of bandwagoning completes the picture. Following Walt (2005:
183), it is the tendency of a state to ally with rather than against the dominant side.
Countries that are relatively close to each other in terms of power capabilities are
more likely to balance, whereas countries whose differential is relatively large are
more likely to bandwagon with the most powerful state to whose strength they feel
attracted (Walt, 1985: 7).
Mearsheimer (1990), Art (1996), and Jervis (2005) suggest that small European
states will seek to retain the security umbrella of the United States that has brought
stability and peace to them. The weak states prefer to bandwagon with the United
States rather than to team up with large European ones because not only have the
Americans proven their benign intent over the course of the Cold War, but also the
contribution of capabilities they could make to the balancing states does not off-set
the gap that would still persist. The characteristic positionality of European states
in relation to their neighbours and the United States should thus determine the
willingness to cooperate or not. With regards to political cooperation, some
quantitative evidence for this logic has been presented by Koenig-Archibugi (2004).
Based on the power-differential model, it is hypothesized that:
HYPOTHESIS 3: EU member states with a low power differential in relation to the
United States show a high rate of membership in cooperative
armaments fora.
Security and dependence
The modern idea that economic interdependence fosters peace and understanding
between states is often traced back to the works by Kant and Reiss ([1795]1970) and
John Stuart Mill ([1865]2007). However, Realists have often cast doubt on the direct
existence of such a causal arrow (Waltz, 2000; Mearsheimer, 2001). In fact, eco-
nomic interdependence as a condition should enter the equation only once the
provision and maintenance of power capabilities is sustained by sources generated
through economic ties. Gains from trade interdependence are weighed against the
disadvantages resulting from economic dependence, a situation that has often been
referred to as the ‘autarky-efficiency dilemma’ (Moravcsik, 1991). It is argued that
states would always prefer to be less dependent if their relative capabilities were not
negatively affected (Waltz, 2000: 15). But states that are relatively independent
economically are, Ceteris paribus, in a stronger position regarding the pursuit of
their core interests than others (Huntington, 1993). As Waltz (2008: 204) notes,
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‘[s]tates, if they can afford to, shy away from becoming excessively dependent on
goods and resources that may be denied them in crises and wars’. Independence
assumes especial salience with regard to security-related goods, as evidenced by the
position of the UK Ministry of Defence (2005: 7), which aims to ‘tell industry very
clearly where, to maintain our national security and keep the sovereign ability to use
our Armed Forces in the way we choose, we need particular industrial capabilities in
the UK [y]’.
Drawing on historical case studies, Papayoanou (1997), for example, specifies
the circumstances under which the degree of trade interdependence influences the
capacity of state leaders to mobilize economic and political resources so as to
counter perceived threats emanating from emerging powers. The author finds that
economic interdependence has played a central role. When status-quo powers had
strong economic ties with emerging powers, the risk of aggression by the latter
was much more likely than when ties had been weak. Mearsheimer (1990: 45)
points out that at the height of the oil crisis of 1973/4, US politicians seriously
discussed seizing Arab oil fields by force of arms. At that time, the United States
feared a significant decline in its capabilities due to its energy dependence. On the
same note, the author maintains that the EU could only become increasingly
economically interdependent because the US security umbrella allowed them to
do so. From this perspective, peace and cooperation were not caused by growing
interdependence, though that may superficially appear to be the case.
The security effects of trade dependence have also been examined by econo-
mists. Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2001) show that trade can have a negative
security externality that outweighs its gains (cf. Gowa, 1989: 1246), and argue in
conclusion that ‘[t]rade and economic interdependence can help resolve conflict,
but it is naive and scientifically inappropriate to think that they are sufficient by
themselves to do so’ (Skaperdas and Syropoulos, 2001: 357). According to Realist
logic, states that do not expose themselves to high levels of general economic
dependence would be even less inclined to cooperate on armaments. Conversely,
active traders do not seem to fear associated losses in their sovereign ability to use
military capabilities, or simply cannot afford to act otherwise. Based on the
security-dependence model, it is hypothesized that:
HYPOTHESIS 4: EU member states with a high degree of import dependence show
a high rate of membership in cooperative armaments fora.
Policy responsiveness
Although public opinion has often been presumed and found to be a determining
factor of government behaviour in democratic representation research (cf. Bur-
stein, 2003), its role in the domain of foreign policy is still an area of heated
debate (Holsti, 2004; Aldrich et al., 2006; Baum and Potter, 2008). Irrespective of
the domain, the quality of democracy is often judged on the basis of how closely
the policy output of governments matches the wishes of the majority of voters.
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In one of the most comprehensive studies, Page and Shapiro (1983) draw on
data containing 357 instances of significant change in the policy preferences of US
voters between 1935 and 1979. They find that large and sustained changes in
public opinion, particularly on salient issues, did effectuate changes in policy at
the local, state, and federal levels. Similar conclusions are reflected in the results of
Monroe (1979, 1998). Opinion-policy consistency exists in about two-thirds of
cases considered, with the highest level in foreign policy.
Nincic (1990) and Risse (1991) investigate the extent to which the United States,
France, Germany, and Japan, respectively, reacted to the Soviet Union’s foreign policy
during the Cold War. Both authors also discover cycles of political behaviour that are
in line with shifts in public opinion, but Risse (1991: 510) adds that the precise effect
was conditioned by domestic constitutional structures as the intervening variable, a
causal combination likewise alluded to by Soroka and Wlezien (2005). More speci-
fically, Hartley and Russett (1992), and Bartels (1991) find that US military spending
is linked to public demands. A sizeable effect is also found by Wlezien (2004), Soroka
and Wlezien (2005) in the case of the United Kingdom, and by Eichenberg and Stoll
(2003) in relation to the United Kingdom, France, and Germany.
Kernic et al. (2002: 21) hold that researchers have not yet given sufficient
attention to the influence of public opinion on matters of security and defence
integration in Europe. This neglect has been unwarranted, as ‘public opinion
represents a strategic variable of primary importance’ (Kernic et al., 2002: 39).
Defence is an important and expensive public good. The opinion of voters, who
are also funding the defence budget in their capacity as taxpayers, may therefore
have an impact on the armament policies of their governments. At least with
respect to the ESDP, Eichenberg (2000: 174) concludes that ‘European leaders are
acting in a way that has long been consistent with domestic opinion’. Based on the
policy-responsiveness model, it is hypothesized that:
HYPOTHESIS 5: EU member states with high public support rates for European
defence cooperation show a high rate of membership in coopera-
tive armaments fora.
Markets and competition
Drawing on data collected from 1974 through 2002, Jacobs and Page (2005) find
evidence that in the United States, the influence of the public on defence policy is
dwarfed by that of business. When it comes to business interests in relation to
defence cooperation between EU member states, the literature on European
integration has, however, as yet been rather silent.
In general, states have two main options in the procurement of military cap-
abilities. First, they can purchase equipment externally. Those European countries
that are members of NATO have imported between 20% and 32% of their defence
equipment from the United States between 1987 and 1999 (Kapstein, 2002: 147).
Portugal and Greece possess only a very weak arms industry and therefore have to
Intergovernmental armaments cooperation 11
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773910000251
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 17:33:06, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
import major systems from abroad (Barros, 2002). In export markets, global com-
petition between large defence companies is intense because many primary systems
are so expensive that only a few companies are able to develop them at a competitive
cost, and buyer countries often require immense offsets for large-scale purchases.10
US firms in particular have gained much ground in comparison to their European
rivals in this respect, not least because early consolidation developments in the 1990s
have given them a post-Cold War first-mover advantage (Hayward, 2001; Crollen,
2003; Schmitt, 2003). However, export markets are key to the survival of European
producers (Moravcsik, 1993a, b; Neal and Taylor, 2001).
Second, countries can procure the material they need domestically, and this is still
standard practice in most large European countries (Cornu, 2001: 71; Keohane and
Valasek, 2008: 36). Due to security reasons, balance of payments considerations, and
concerns about technological advantage, governments want to retain a say in the
activities of national armaments producers. At the same time, they have an interest in
their national champions being able to create export opportunities for their products,
thereby increasing capital investment at home and lowering the cost of maintaining
indigenous capabilities. This presupposes that the country possesses a sizeable, and
therefore internationally competitive, defence industry. From an economic viewpoint,
the creation of export opportunities through cooperation is thus a win-win situation
for governments and armaments companies. All national markets in Europe without
exception are too small to generate adequate economies of scale (James, 2001: 102).
As a result, the consolidation process within the European defence industry has been
driven by the desire for size (Schmitt, 2000: 26–28). Firms are increasingly trying to
capture foreign market shares by acquisitions that either integrate their operations
vertically, thereby increasing technological expertise and revenue through the inter-
nalization of profitable subsystems, or horizontally, so as to enhance the transfer-
ability of managerial skills and the differentiation of products (Hayward, 2001: 120).
Given governments’ stakes in their defence technological and industrial base, coop-
eration on armaments provides a way to facilitate this process in the pursuit of
collective benefits from cross-border consolidation. Based on the market-competition
model, it is hypothesized that:
HYPOTHESIS 6: EU member states with a highly competitive domestic defence
technological and industrial base show a high rate of membership
in cooperative armaments fora.
This section has presented the six hypotheses to be tested. While each was for-
mulated in such a way as to let their respective causal conditions explain the
outcome individually, combinations of conditions are not precluded. On the
contrary, conjunctural rather than individual causation is expected.
10 Offsets are direct or indirect industrial compensation arrangements required by foreign govern-
ments or foreign firms as a condition of the purchase of defence goods or services. The financial scope of
these arrangements varies, but often exceeds the procurement contract value.
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Operationalization and data sources
Some of the conditions that operationalize the hypotheses derived from the six
models have become widely accepted. Others, however, have only recently been
introduced to the discipline or have not yet been applied in this context. Condi-
tion labels are given in parentheses.11
Membership rate (membership)
The outcome condition is a monadic count of membership in formal intergovern-
mental agreements on armaments cooperation. In order to qualify as an instance under
this definition, the agreement’s main purpose had to be economic rather than political.
This includes the standardization of military equipment, joint research, development
and production activities, joint procurement mechanisms, trade-related legal harmo-
nization, or any combination thereof. The agreements included are the European
Air Group, the European Defence Agency, LoI, NORDAC, OCCAR, the Western
European Armaments Group, and the Western European Armaments Organisation.
Constitutional-culture model (federalism)
The constitutional culture model uses the Regional Authority Index in order to measure
the degree to which a country’s domestic constitutional setup is federalist in character
(Hooghe et al., 2008; Marks et al., 2008). It is derived from eight competencies
of regional government, namely institutional depth, policy scope, fiscal autonomy,
representation, law-making, executive control, fiscal control, and constitutional reform.
Homogeneity-trust model (homogeneity)
Constructivists have often been criticized for a lack of transparent measures. As
‘Constructivists regard international structures to be social structures’ (Ruggie,
1998: 879), participation in multinational military missions should operationalize
such a structure transparently. States may develop, through preferential homo-
geneity in the motive for conducting the mission, or functional homogeneity in
pursuance of a common goal, the degree of trust in others’ ability and integrity that
is required to enter into further cooperation in more sensitive areas such as arma-
ments cooperation. Being embedded in these structures creates opportunities that
allow participants to ‘screen’ these qualities.12 Therefore, the homogeneity-trust
model is operationalized through bilateral interaction scores based on all UN and
NATO military missions conducted between 1996 and 2006. Each EU country can
11 The codebook and data set with all base variables and fuzzified conditions are available from the
author on request.
12 Functionalism would reverse the argumentation, and hypothesize that the efficient conduct of joint
missions necessitates armaments cooperation in order to guarantee standardized, or at least interoper-
able, equipment. However, illustrative case study research has shown that more often the opposite results
because operational requirements rarely overlap (e.g. Lorell and Lowell, 1995).
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have up to 14 EU partners per mission-year. The higher the score, the thicker the
interaction process, and the larger the potential for trust development.13
Power-differential model (power)
The Correlates of War project’s Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC)
has become widely accepted as an indicator of power (e.g. Geller, 1993; Maoz,
2004; Sweeney and Fritz, 2004).14 It incorporates an industrial, a military, and a
demographic dimension, translating a state’s score into a share of the international
system (Singer et al., 1972; Singer, 1988). For constructing a measure that is valid in
the EU–US context, each state’s absolute component was converted to a share of a
subsystem comprising only the EU-15 plus the United States. As the CINC does not
cover all relevant years, a new index based on the same structure was computed
using data on military expenditure in constant 2005 US$ (Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute, 1997–2007), military personnel (International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 1997–2007), total population, urban population, and energy use in
kilograms of oil equivalent (World Bank, 2008), as well as steel production figures
(World Steel Association, 2009).
Security-dependence model (dependence)
The concept of economic dependence has been studied from two perspectives
based on the inclusive concept of interdependence. The first is the economist’s
view, the second is that of International Relations Theory (Baldwin, 1980; Wal-
lace, 1986). In the latter, the notion of interdependence has been applied to
capture the concept of import vulnerability. Therefore, scores are computed by
dividing current account debits of goods and services by GDP.
Policy-responsiveness model (support)
The data on national public opinion about cooperation in defence is taken from the
Eurobarometer Survey Series 1995–2005. The question asked was: ‘For defence and
foreign affairs, do you think that decisions should be made by the (Nationality)
Government, or made jointly within the European Union?’ Public support scores take
the percentage figure for those preferring cooperation minus the percentage figure for
those being against it. In order to account for response delay, public opinion is lagged
by 1 year, a value work on policy responsiveness has found to be reasonable (e.g.
Eichenberg and Stoll, 2003; Jacobs and Page, 2005; Soroka and Wlezien, 2005).
13 The indicator only captures the number of interactions – the quantitative channel, but not the
intensity of each interaction – the qualitative channel. Contributions that are largely symbolic rather than
substantial may not have the same effect, and may well lead to loss of trust in the case of unfulfilled
expectations, but they do not invalidate the logic of trust development as a result of preferential or
functional homogeneity.
14 Others have advocated GDP instead (e.g. Organski and Kugler, 1980; de Soysa et al., 1997;
Wohlforth, 1999).
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Market-competition model (competitiveness)
Average defence company size is the indicator for the competitiveness of a
country’s domestic armaments industry. It is computed by summing up the arms
sales of all defence companies listed by the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute based on size, and divides it by their number, reflecting an
average ability to capture export market shares and acquire foreign companies
(Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1997–2007). All current dollar
sales figures have been converted to constant 2000 US$.
The fuzzy-set QCA approach
The core idea behind QCA is that most social science theory is based on set
relations, which are always asymmetric, as opposed to correlation-based methods,
which are inherently symmetric. For example, the hypothesis that some causal
condition x1 led to outcome y has two implications. First, the fact that y was also
brought about by some other causal condition x2 does not invalidate the initial
hypothesis. In set-relational terms, x1 is a subset of the set of conditions that led to
y. Second, the connection between x1 and y is asymmetric. Were one to investigate
the correlation between conditions and outcome, the fact that x2 also led to y
would undermine the correlation between x1 and y, although this was not part of
the original argument.
The verbal nature in which most social science theory is formulated, however,
entails explicit connections between causes and outcome that require the
decomposition of correlational statements into set relationships. This can be
achieved in two ways. The first proceeds from the existence of an outcome shared
by the units of analysis to the shared conditions hypothesized to be causally
connected. Here, the outcome is a subset of the larger set of cases with the same
causal conditions, and is thus suitable for tests of necessity. The second is to
proceed from shared causal conditions of cases, or their combination, to a shared
outcome. This strategy is consistent with arguments about sufficiency, where
instances of the causes are a subset of instances of the outcome (Ragin, 2008).
Expressed in set-relational language, this article tests whether any of the six
individual conditions, or some combination thereof, represents a sufficient causal
path to a high rate of membership in cooperative armaments fora.
While set relations provide the logic, the idea of fuzziness extends them in ways
useful for social research. The social sciences are often described as ‘soft’ because
they deal with concepts marked by imprecision and uncertainty. Fuzzy sets differ
from conventional probabilistic thinking in that they substitute uncertainty
associated with randomness by uncertainty associated with characteristic impre-
cision (Clark et al., 2008: 31). A fuzzy set A is defined by a set of ordered pairs,
so that,
A ¼ fðx; mAðxÞÞjx 2 A; mAðxÞ 2 ½0; 1g;
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where mA(x) is the membership function that specifies the degree mA in the interval
between 0 and 1 to which every xAA belongs to A. Those elements with mA5 1
have full membership in A, whereas those with mA5 0 have full non-membership.
At mA5 0.5 – the cross-over that determines whether a case is more in (.0.5) than
out (,0.5) – set membership is most ambiguous. In this sense, a fuzzy-set mem-
bership score can more precisely be regarded as a continuous measure, purpose-
fully calibrated along three thresholds so as to match the logic of the underlying
concept in a qualitative as well as a quantitative way (Ragin, 2008: 30). The
membership function translates all elements of the base variable into fuzzy-set
membership scores.15 In order to fuzzify all base variables, conditions, and out-
come, I use the logistic function
mAðxÞ ¼
1
1 þ ex ;
where x is the log odds of membership scaled in relation to the cross-over.16
Thresholds for full non-membership, the cross-over, and full membership were
set at mA5 0.05, mA5 0.5, and mA5 0.95. This was not implemented in a
mechanistic fashion. When assigning membership scores to longitudinal data, it is
important to distinguish between base variables in which quantitative trends shift
the qualitative meaning of membership scores and those where they do not, since
trends in the measures of tendency or spread used for calibration may lead to
inconsistencies between the fuzzified conditions and the qualitative meaning of
their underlying concepts. A recalibration may therefore be required.17 A net
public support rate of 0%, for example, remains the cross-over in which the
indicator is at its most ambiguous level. When politicians do not perceive public
pressure in either direction, they have no incentive to act. Trends in the range
or central tendency of the base variable are not qualitatively linked to set
membership scores, and thresholds are externally defined. Conversely, country
membership rates in armaments fora tend to grow over time. This necessitates
a re-calibration of membership scores. Here, thresholds are defined internally.
Re-calibrations were implemented for the outcome and all conditions except
support and dependence.18
15 The process is often referred to as calibration or fuzzification.
16 This is the standard membership function implemented in the fsQCA software by Ragin et al.
(2006). For details of the calibration procedure, see Ragin (2008). Other functions, such as the cumu-
lative distribution of the uniform density have also been used (e.g. Koenig-Archibugi, 2004). However,
they are not flexible enough as any two non-identical thresholds will define the fuzzy set.
17 The logic is similar to the de-trending of time series. However, instead of removing the trend
directly, cut-off values are re-calibrated in line with changes in the base variable whose fuzzification at
initial thresholds would decrease the level of consistency with the qualitative meaning of the fuzzy set
label.
18 All base variable values underlying the thresholds for full non-membership aNM, cross-over aCO,
and full membership aFM are provided in the Appendix.
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Analysis and results
The data set contains 165 observations. Figure 1 presents the fuzzified outcome
set in a level plot ordered according to membership score row sums across years.
Darker panels indicate high membership, whereas brighter panels indicate low
membership.19 At the top are the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and
Spain, followed by Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Finland,
with a majority of membership scores still exceeding the cross-over.
Figure 2 presents the respective membership scores for each condition, country,
and year. The pattern of shading shows pronounced temporal fluctuations for
homogeneity (2b), support (2e), and competitiveness (2f). Conversely, structural
conditions that are expected to remain relatively stable, such as federalism (2a),
show only minor shifts or even none at all.
Figure 1 Membership scores in a set of countries with high rate of forum Membership
19 It is important not to confuse membership scores, which denote the degree of belonging to a fuzzy
set, and membership rate, which is the label of the outcome condition.
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The results of the minimization procedure are presented in Table 1.20 At a
frequency cut-off of six cases and a consistency threshold of 80%, two distinct
pathways to the outcome have been found under the intermediate solution, and
two under the parsimonious solution.21 In none is evidence found for the existence
of balancing or bandwagoning behaviour as argued by Art (2006), Layne (2006), or
Jervis (2005). I will assess the intermediate solution first.22 Following standard set
Figure 2 Fuzzy-set membership scores of causal conditions
20 Although all hypotheses imply set relations of sufficiency between the condition and the outcome,
tests for necessity were performed. Only homogeneity had a significant consistency level of 86%. An
analysis of sufficiency using asymmetric coding was not performed. Despite theoretical benefits, not
having a low membership score to produce the outcome is not part of the above-formulated hypotheses.
21 A partial truth table is provided in the Appendix. The frequency cut-off determines the minimum
number of cases that have to fall into a specific combination of conditions. At a cut-off of six, 86% of
cases are captured. The number of causal combinations is an exponentially growing function of the
number of conditions. With six conditions, there are 26564 different combinations. Consistency pro-
vides a measure of how well the results match the subset relation for sufficiency, and is evaluated using the
following formula: Consistency(Xi<Yi)5
P
[min(Xi,Yi)]=
P
Xi.
22 Simplifying assumptions: present5 federalism, homogeneity, dependence, support, competitive-
ness; absent5power.
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notation, the symbol ‘\’ denotes intersection and takes the minimum value in
combinations of sets, ‘[’ stands for union and takes the maximum value, and ‘D’
indicates the subset relation.23 The two paths are the following with:
(Dependence \ support \ homogeneity \ federalism) [
(Competitiveness \ homogeneity) D membership
The first path intersects the security-dependence model, the policy-responsiveness
model, the homogeneity-trust model, and the constitutional culture model, while
the second integrates the market-competition model with the homogeneity-trust
model. In the subsequent discussion, I will refer to the former as ‘Complex
Predisposition’, denoted by CP. It combines specific structural conditions that are
relatively time invariant, such as a country’s constitutional culture, and may also
be responsible for similar state policy choices in other domains, with factors that
Figure 2 Continued
23 More precisely defined, the intersection C of two fuzzy sets A and B of x is given by C(x)5
min[A(x),B(x)]. The union C of two fuzzy sets A and B of x is given by C(x)5max[A(x),B(x)]. A fuzzy set
A is a subset of another fuzzy set B if for all x, A(x)<B(x).
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have a more immediate bearing, such as public support. The latter will be referred
to as ‘Partners-for-Profit’, denoted by PfP, because it is a combination of a
country’s economic strategy resulting from its industry’s position and the depen-
dence on competent partners to realize it.
At about 88%, the consistency of CP approximates a perfect subset relationship at a
significant level, given the large number of observations. PfP even shows a consistency
score of about 96%, a value at which a perfect subset relationship is virtually achieved.
It is almost always sufficient with respect to a high rate of membership. At a joint value
of 92%, this indicates that the two paths are also highly consistent over time.
However, consistency often works against coverage, which provides a measure
of the empirical weight of the set-relational connection.24 Despite displaying high
consistency scores, coverage for both solutions is far from trivial. The raw score of
CP, which does not take into account the overlap of variation in the outcome also
accounted for by PfP, is about 28%. This indicates an empirical magnitude that
can certainly be considered substantial. PfP has a raw score of 47%, which means
Figure 2 Continued
24 Coverage is evaluated using the following formula: Coverage(Xi<Yi)5
P
[min(Xi,Yi)]=
P
Yi.
20 A L R I K T H I E M
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773910000251
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 17:33:06, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
that the sum of outcome membership scores of the subset-consistent observations
is almost covered by half. Given the higher consistency score, this underlines the
higher empirical importance of PfP all the more. When treated as alternative
paths, both solutions have a joint coverage score of about 62%.
The relative empirical weight of PfP becomes even more pronounced when
unique coverage scores are taken into account. As some cases conform to more
than one combination of conditions, assessing unique coverage provides a way of
disentangling their respective relative importance (Ragin, 2008: 63). The results
show that almost half of the coverage that is due to CP is in fact covered by PfP,
but only about a quarter of PfP’s coverage is also due to CP. This suggests that the
less complex combination may indeed be the empirically more important one. A
qualitative investigation of this result is impossible within the scope of this article,
but it certainly provides some general indication as to which combinatorial
pathway may guide more detailed case analyses focusing on empirical weight.
Countries with the potential to expand their prime systems export market share
may find it easier to enter into such agreements with preferentially or functionally
homogeneous countries. In essence, what economic cooperation in security matters
Figure 2 Continued
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requires is a fair portion of confidence in partners’ professional integrity and
technical ability. It then comes as no surprise to see the Swedish Ministry of
Defence (2004: 19) seeking to cooperate only with ‘the most important countries
as regards the international skills we need for our equipment supply’. Figure 3
visualizes the intermediate solution in panels a and b. Panel b in fact attests to
Sweden’s increasingly methodical involvement in armaments cooperation after the
1990s. In the case of Austria, the principle of neutrality clearly was an issue
during the 1990s, but has been gradually hollowed out in recent years, politically
as well as economically.25
CP presents a less simple path. High economic dependence indicates a low
reservation point for international cooperation, which integrates with a propensity to
Figure 2 Continued
25 A specific provision in the Austrian Federal Constitution (Article 23f) accords precedence to
decisions taken in the framework of CFSP over the Federal Constitutional Law on Austria’s Permanent
Neutrality. It was further amended to clarify that Austria’s participation in Petersberg Task missions is not
to be restricted by the Federal Constitutional Law. In the first half of 2011, Austria will for the first time
contribute forces to EU Battle Groups.
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Figure 2 Continued
Table 1. Intermediate (IMT) and parsimonious solution (PMS)a
Raw coverage Unique coverage Consistency
Minimal formula IMT PMS IMT PMS IMT PMS
Dependence \ support \
homogeneity \ federalism 0.284 0.155 0.886
Competitiveness \ homogeneity 0.470 0.341 0.965
Competitiveness 0.514 0.185 0.965
Support \ federalism 0.527 0.197 0.891
Total
Frequency cut-off 6
Consistency cut-off 0.8
Solution coverage 0.625 0.711
Solution consistency 0.923 0.898
aSimplifying assumptions for intermediate solution: present5 (federalism, homogeneity,
dependence, support, competitiveness); absent5 (power).
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delegate authority, here in the form of an indirect transfer of control over national
armaments acquisition. When these conditions are supplemented by public support
for joint action and preferential or functional homogeneity, the requirements for
cooperation in an area as sensitive as armaments cooperation may be fulfilled.
Though the two paths are quite disparate, the commonality of homogeneity is
noticeable. In fact, it was the only condition in tests of necessity with a sufficiently
high consistency level of 86%.
Without this component, the empirical relevance of the remaining conditions
may decline sharply. This can be tested by choosing a parsimonious solution instead
of an intermediate one. Not only could the plausibility of the argument be sig-
nificantly undermined, but coverage may also approach triviality, depending on the
overlap of the subset-consistent cases in both solutions. That requires a less con-
servative strategy as far as the incorporation of logical remainders is concerned.26
In fact, only 10 of the 64 logically possible combinations contain over 90% of
the data, and 48 of them hold no observations at all. A useful strategy in such a
situation is to allow for counterfactual cases (Fearon, 1991; Tetlock and Belkin,
1996; Ragin, 2008). In contrast to the intermediate solution, a parsimonious
solution takes easy as well as difficult counterfactuals into account. However, as
each condition was hypothesized to contribute individually to the outcome
without foreclosing combinations, causal implausibilities should not arise. For
instance, the influence of business interests on policy is as likely in the absence of
public support as it is in its presence (e.g. Jacobs and Page, 2005).
When allowing for easy as well as difficult counterfactuals, competitiveness is
the reduction to PfP, but only in 30 of the 165 cases was homogeneity the con-
straining condition, resulting in similarity of the two paths as graphically revealed
in panels b and c of Figure 3. Although the gains from cooperation may be
reduced without homogeneity because additional collective control would be
required to offset the absence of relational trust, this essentially means that
business is the dominant component in the subset relation. As the UK Ministry of
Defence (2005: 32) underlines, ‘[e]xports are an important part of the defence
economic landscape’.27 Alternatively, support \ federalism is the reduction to
CP.28 This result lends weight to arguments that have been made by a number of
scholars on the combined effect of public opinion and constitutional culture. Risse
(1991) as well as Soroka and Wlezien (2005), for example, emphasize that the
effect of public opinion on policy appears to be conditional on a country’s con-
stitutional design through which it is filtered.
26 Logical remainders are combinations of conditions that are logically possible, but do not hold any
cases for reasons of non-inclusion or non-existence.
27 Since homogeneity was the only condition with a significant consistency level in necessity tests, this
path should be treated with some caution.
28 Besides support \ federalism, support \ homogeneity and federalism \ dependence are alternative,
but redundant prime implicants.
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Conclusion
Which conditions are relevant in explaining why governments join international
agreements in an area as potentially threatening to core national interests as
armaments? Using fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis, this article identified
two distinct paths to cooperation in the EU for the years 1996–2006 that
represent sufficient causal combinations. Equifinality involves diversity, and the
results confirmed this fact through two distinct paths under which countries have
joined formal agreements. Foremost among the reasons for states to do so were
economic motives. This is reflected in the defence industrial strategies of many
European governments. Technological advancement and the consolidation of the
US armaments industry have put pressure on European countries to strengthen
their defence industrial base if important export market shares are not to be lost.
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Figure 3 Intermediate Solution (a and b) and Parsimonious Solution (c and d)
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In addition, a competitive industrial base maintains and develops important tech-
nological skills, and generates employment and balance of payments benefits.
However, the international division of production, the harmonization of weapons
export procedures, and the sharing of knowledge are risky strategies, so participating
governments want to make sure that their partners have the technological ability and
professional integrity to create the theoretical basis for successful cooperation.
Alternatively, countries seem to enter into cooperation for reasons other than
economically driven motives. A constitutional culture marked by federalist struc-
tures predisposes them to share control more willingly, and combines with public
support for joint European action in defence matters, an open economy, and
homogeneity to produce the conditions sufficient for active cooperation. These two
diverse paths confirmed the advantages of applying a data-driven identification of
relevant conditions. While five of the six perspectives received support to different
degrees, in none of the combinations of conditions was a country’s power differ-
ential in relation to the US component. Although this must not be interpreted as
hard evidence against a Realist logic behind intergovernmental armaments coop-
eration in Europe, it certainly reduces its explanatory traction.
Intergovernmental cooperation on armaments is increasingly prioritized in Eur-
opean capitals. Initiatives inside and outside the EU framework will further shape
the development of the European defence market on both the supply and the
demand side in the years to come. Ongoing discussions about the incorporation of
OCCAR into the European Defence Agency attest to this dynamic, which will not
only affect those countries that have formed the population of this analysis. Pres-
sures to restructure armaments procurement have also been high in Central and
Eastern European countries. Their armed forces participate in international military
missions along with Western European neighbours, but economic history did not
produce the conditions conducive to the emergence of an internationally competitive
armaments industry that could contribute much to EU-wide restructuring efforts
apart from acting as vital export markets or niche system suppliers. In short, Central
and East European governments are no ideal partners for profit. Whether they will
choose to align themselves more closely with the United States, as Poland did in
2003 when it set the seal on one of the largest single military contracts negotiated in
Europe after the end of the Cold War, involving the procurement of 48 Lockheed
Martin F-16s instead of Saab’s Gripen and Dassault’s Mirage, or to participate
readily in European fora may thus partly depend on the alternative combination of
conditions identified in this article.
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Appendix
Table A1. Partial truth tablea
Federalism Homogeneity Power Competitiveness Support Dependence Membership Number Consistency PRE Product
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 33 0.994 0.994 0.988
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 10 0.970 0.961 0.933
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 9 0.891 0.850 0.758
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 20 0.875 0.768 0.672
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 8 0.775 0.473 0.366
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 6 0.774 0.519 0.402
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 39 0.712 0.496 0.353
0 1 1 0 0 1 0 10 0.669 0.358 0.239
aOutcome (membership) coded 1 if number> 6 and consistency> 0.8; ordered according to consistency.
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Table A2. Recalibration valuesa
Condition/years 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Membership
aNM 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
aCO 2.0 2.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 3.0 3.0 3.0
aFM 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
Federalism
aNM 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
aCO 12.6 12.6 12.7 12.8 12.8 12.9 13.0 13.0 13.1 13.1 13.1
aFM 30.5 30.5 30.5 30.5 30.5 30.5 30.5 30.5 30.5 30.5 30.5
Homogeneity
aNM 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6
aCO 38 39 39 41 42 44 46 48 50 51 51
aFM 83 83 83 83 83 83 98 98 98 98 98
Power
aNM 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28
aCO 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36
aFM 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.41
Dependence
aNM 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
aCO 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
aFM 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Support (net percentage figures)
aNM 233.3 233.3 233.3 233.3 233.3 233.3 233.3 233.3 233.3 233.3 233.3
aCO 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
aFM 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3
Competitiveness (constant 2000 US$ millions)
aNM 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127
aCO 589 576 567 565 557 551 543 543 548 556 568
aFM 2026 2026 2026 2026 2026 2026 2026 2026 2026 2026 2026
aFull non-membership threshold aNM corresponds to 5th percentile of A, cross-over aCO to the mean of A, and the full membership
threshold aFM to the 95th percentile of A, except dependence and support which are externally defined.
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